Introduction
William Blackstone in his Commentaries explained that, 'By marriage the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or is at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover she performs everything.'
1 Despite this flat declaration, there was a steady stream of lawsuits against married women in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Most of the cases were brought by tradesmen or merchants seeking payment for services rendered or goods sold. The typical contexts were two: when married women transacted business as if single, as femes sole, and when married women lived separate from their husbands and purchased goods or services for subsistence, as 'necessaries'.
Even when Blackstone wrote, exceptions to the 'unity of the persons' theory had been recognised. The established rules were summarised by De Grey CJCP in 1776 in the case of Hatchett v. Baddeley. 2 The defendant had eloped from her husband and lived separate and apart from him; plaintiffs performed work for the defendant at her request and on her credit only. After stating the baseline rule with more specificity than did Blackstone, 3 De Grey noted the existence of exceptions easy would only induce them to desert their husbands. There is therefore no force in the argument of the wife's difficulty of procuring credit. Indeed, if her departure be adulterous, probably there is someone [who] will provide for her.
De Grey CJ did acknowledge that a married woman 'who quit [her husband] for his cruelty' could retain rights to alimony and dower, perhaps implying that in such circumstances she might be independently credit-worthy.
William Blackstone had been appointed to the Court of Common Pleas in 1770, where he served until his death a decade later. His views of the rights of married women remained fixed, and in the Hatchett case, he was 'clearly of opinion, that in no case can any feme covert be sued alone, except in the known excepted cases of abjuration, exile, and the like; where the husband is considered as dead, and the woman as a widow or else as divorced a vinculo'. 7 Blackstone added, for good measure, 'The rules of law should not be broken through for the sake of tradesmen.' One situation recognised by the common law judges in the eighteenth century as analogous to a civil death was when the husband had been convicted of a felony and transported to the colonies for life. This was said to justify suit in England against the wife for her unpaid debts. 9 In a trial on assize at Carlisle in 1768, Pearson v. Carruthers, Yates JKB extended the exception to a case of transportation for a term of years. The decision was not reported, but it became well known, because
Yates privately canvassed the opinions of all the judges before giving his final decision. According to a manuscript report of Carruthers, the plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit against the defendant, who pleaded coverture, claiming 'that her husband had been alive and in Cumberland within three months of the trial'. 10 The plaintiff's response was that the husband had been 'convicted of a crime for which he had been transported, for a term of years not yet expired'. This was objected to by counsel 7 2 W. Bl. at 1082, citing Coke on Littleton 133. 8 Buller and East, Misc. MS 97, 141. 9 Lord Mansfield in the Ringsted case remarked that he had decided such a case at the Maidstone assizes: 3 Doug at 198.
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Harvard Law School, MS 4057, f. 206, (1759--68) . All references in the printed reports to the case before Yates J at the 1768 Carlisle assizes cite the case by the name of Sparrow v. Carruthers. From the descriptions, it is clear that it is the same case as that in the manuscript report under the name of Pearson v. Carruthers, or a parallel case brought by a different creditor.
for the defendant, who argued 'that the wife was not suable as a feme sole, notwithstanding her husband's transportation, he being yet alive'. Yates J's opinion was that 'the circumstances of the case dissolved the wife's incapacity to contract,' but as a caution, he instructed that the verdict for the plaintiff was to be subject to the opinion of the Court of King's Bench. Afterwards, Yates reported that, 'the action being for a small sum, and the parties poor, he had not put them to the expence of arguing the point in court, but would take the opinion of the judges of B.R. upon it, out of court'.
Later, he 'declared that all the judges of England were of opinion that the action well lay'. 12 There, the plaintiff sued a married woman for goods sold and delivered and work and labour performed in finishing and fitting up a house on St James Street. Lord Mansfield 'said that if a married woman was to pass as a single woman, he should have no doubt about the cause, for then she would not be permitted to say afterwards she was married, for that she would be a cheat'. In the case before him, however, it was proved that the plaintiff continued work after learning that the defendant was married, and thus he was not permitted to recover.
In the mid-1780s, a trilogy of cases brought on the full development of Lord Mansfield's views on married women debtors. In Ringsted v. Lady Lanesborough, 13 he repeated the fundamental rule that at common law, 'a wife has no civil capacity or power of acting without her husband, under He said that the three cases -Ringsted, Barwell, and Corbett -were fundamentally governed by 'the great principle which the Court has laid down, "that where a woman has a separate estate, and acts and receives credit as a feme sole, she shall be liable as such"'.
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The cases coming before the courts in the years that followed were varied, including more suits by creditors against married women who had behaved in the market place as if femes sole, and cases against husbands for necessaries extended to their wives. 23 During 1787-8, Lord Mansfield was inactive due to failing health (though he survived until 1793), and Buller J was de facto chief justice.
Buller continued to follow the line of cases that had culminated in Corbett v. Poelnitz. In Tunks v.
Williams, the defendant and her husband lived separately and she had a separate maintenance; thus, as
Buller told the jury, 'she alone is liable to pay all the debts she may contract; so far solemn decisions declare'. 24 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against Mrs Williams for £27, despite strong
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The quoted language is from a manuscript report of the According to another report of the case in The Times, June 20 1787, 3, the husband 'frequently visited the defendant, conversed with her in terms of familiarity, called her his dear and his dame, frequently dined and supped in her company, . . . and went to her bed--chamber at ten and eleven at night; but whether he lay there or not was not proved, and it was admitted that she never went to his house '. 26 Ironically, one of the earliest coverture cases to come before Lord Kenyon featured Lady Lanesborough, who had been before Lord Mansfield in the Ringsted case. Ganer v. Lady Lanesborough (1790) Peake 25, also in manuscript notes in a book kept by Vicary Gibbs, 'Cases at Nisi Prius 1782--1811', MS 17, Middle Temple Library, London, f.77. Ganer brought an action of debt on a judgment, and Lady Lanesborough's defence was that she was married to John King. According to the Gibbs manuscript, Ganer replied that King, a Jew, 'had been before married to one Sara Lara, a Jewish woman', and this was supported by testimony of the clerk of the notary. The clerk had been at the wedding, and he said that it had been conducted 'according to the Jewish rites'. Peake's report states that Lady Lanesborough and King 'were divorced at Leghorn [Livorno, Italy] according to the rites and customs of the Jews there', and 'she produced an instrument under the seal of the synagogue there'. Lord Kenyon 'held this to be no evidence, for before he could take notice of any proceeding in a foreign Court, he must know the law of the country, which was a matter of evidence, and should be proved by witnesses', Peake at 25--26. Ultimately, Sara Lara was allowed to confirm the divorce by her own testimony, over the objection of the plaintiff that Lara was not a competent witness. The jury verdict was for the defendant. from her husband of a regular annuity of £200 per annum payable at a London bank. At trial, according to Espinasse, Lord Kenyon seemed to think this proof sufficient, but the question was reserved for the full court. Espinasse ended his report by saying that when the case came on, 'the other Judges seemed to concur in opinion with Lord Kenyon; but no judgment has been given'. 30 In a subsequent report of the case in The Times, however, Kenyon mused that, 'The loose manners of the present time had rendered cases of this kind more frequent', and, 'When it was said, that laws were to be framed according to the custom of the times, he was afraid that was a most dangerous proposition; who was to set the fashion -where were they to find it?' 31 On the case before the court, he thought the annuity was ad arbitrium viri, something the husband could revoke at any moment, and without the security of a deed, the action would not lie. supposed to be adapted to the altering fashions of the times, overturn the established law of the land: it descended to us as a sacred charge, and it is our duty to preserve it'.
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Lord Kenyon was less sure of himself when the husband was out of the country. In 1797 in two suits brought against the Duchess of Pienne, he was willing to allow creditors to sue the defendant when her husband (a foreigner) had gone abroad and had stayed away for several years. 38 In the first of these, Walford v. Duchess of Pienne, Kenyon was pragmatic, saying that since the husband had deserted the kingdom, was no longer domiciled in England, and had been gone for years, the wife 'might be starved' if she could not be held liable for her debts because otherwise she would not be before eleven of the twelve judges -first on 9 May 1798 before all the justices except Perryn B, and again on 10 May1800 before all the justices except Buller J. The action was brought in assumpsit on the common counts for goods sold, money laid out, and work performed for the defendant, who pleaded her coverture. The plaintiff replied that the defendant and her husband had mutually covenanted and agreed to live separate and apart, and that a competent separate maintenance of £200
per annum had been secured to the defendant by deed and had been duly paid to her.
The report of the Marshall case published by Durnford and East in the Term Reports is relatively brief, containing only Lord Kenyon's judgment. According to that report, Kenyon described the general question as 'whether by any agreement between a man and his wife, she may be made legally responsible for the contracts she may enter into, and be liable to the actions of those who may have trusted to her engagements, as if she were sole and unmarried'. 42 He then stated that, after two arguments before all the judges, 'and after a very full consideration, the opinion of all the judges who heard the last argument is, that this action cannot be supported'. He tipped his hand early in his opinion by stating that the agreement between husband and wife to live separate and apart from each other was 'a contract supposed to be made between two parties, who according to the text of Littleton, foundation fail, the consequence is, that the whole superstructure must also fail'. 43 He said this would introduce 'all the confusion and inconvenience which must necessarily result from so anomalous and mixed a character', and he listed a series of questions that would naturally follow if the plaintiff's argument were to succeed. He claimed that the plaintiff's argument rested only on the simple proposition 'that where the husband ceases to be the protector of his wife, and is not liable to have any claim made on him for her support and maintenance, it necessarily follows that she herself must be her own protectress, make contracts for herself, and be responsible for them'. of Common Pleas. By the time the second argument was held two years later, Ashhurst J had resigned and Buller J was in failing health (he died a month after the second argument, which he did not attend). Also, Eyre CJ of the Court of Common Pleas, who attended the first argument, died in July 1799 and was replaced by the former Attorney General, Sir John Scott, newly created Lord Eldon.
At the first argument, the plaintiff was represented by Josiah-Iles Wathen; the defendant by Stephen Gaselee. Wathen cited most of the cases that have been discussed, relying especially on Barwell and Corbett. Gaselee, in response, questioned whether the facts of Marshall fell within the authority of the cases that were cited, pointing out that it was not within a married woman's power by her own acts to dissolve the civil contract of marriage, and that she could not bring suit by herself. that the first principle (that since the husband was not liable, the wife must be) would not hold, and the other principle that referred to the case of Govier v. Hancock 47 was 'not decent for me to discuss'
(it dealt with adultery). 48 Kenyon remarked that some of the old law was 'very immoral'-it 'prevents the breach between husband and wife being healed'. The last observations from the bench recorded by Lawrence J for the May 1798 argument were the following weary remarks by Eyre CJ: 'I feel more difficulty from the authorities than from the principles. The report of the case by Bosanquet and Puller is dated 21 June 1800, but the case was heard before the second argument in Marshall v. Rutton on 10 May 1800. Near the end of the printed report (at 233), Bosanquet and Puller state: 'As the case of Marshall v. Mary Rutton, 8 TR 545, in which it was expected that the whole doctrine respecting the liability of a feme covert to be sued would be fully discussed, was then pending before the twelve judges, the Court desired that this case might stand over until that had been determined'. Lord Eldon had become Chief Justice of Common Pleas in July 1799, and after the Marshall decision issued, the court in the Marsh case affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that the defendant's claim of coverture was valid. if the plaintiff were permitted to prevail, 'it would sanction the arrest of every married woman whose husband should go abroad upon the service of his country'.
Necessaries and the Tradesmen's Dilemma
As has by now become obvious, the position of the tradesmen and merchants who dealt with were very few situations that would permit the merchants to recover judgments against married women, even when the husbands were beyond reach or could not be held liable. One semi-safe harbour, however, was when the goods sold or services rendered appeared to be 'necessaries', for which husbands would ordinarily be responsible. Yet even these situations were uncertain. Did the customer live with her husband in marital contentment, such that all transactions would be the The law is thus. If a woman wilfully and without any reasonable cause leaves her husband's house and lives elsewhere without his consent, there he is not liable for any debts which she may contract. But if he thrusts her out of doors, or acts in such a manner as renders it impossible for her to continue under the same roof, as by keeping a mistress under her nose, there he sends her out with a credit upon all the world, for such things as are necessary for a person in a situation of life which he himself holds and he is liable for so much.
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Accordingly, the jury found for the plaintiff.
As Buller J stated, the level of support to which the wife was entitled was to be measured by
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Buller and East, Misc. MS 97, 132v, sittings after Easter Term, 1787, Westminster Hall. 76 Ibid. at 132v--133. Buller 'also added that in the latter case, if he wishes to put an end to her credit, he must apply to her to come back and live with him'. the husband's 'situation in life'. Put another way, there was a clear recognition by the judges that husbands were to be protected against spendthrift wives, provided that husbands did their best to keep their wives under control. The report in The Times of the 1793 case of Dyde v. Bewicke began as follows: 'This is an action of the greatest importance to every husband in the kingdom, who has the misfortune to have an extravagant wife, to all haberdashers, milleners, and to tradesmen in general'.
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The defendant was a clergyman. Erskine, in the clergyman's defence, said that it seemed to be presumed by the plaintiffs that a husband was responsible for whatever his wife might chuse to purchase', but 'could this authority possibly cover two cloaks (accounting for more than half of the plaintiffs' bill) that could not without disgrace be worn by the wife of a person of a degree no higher than this clergyman'? Lord Kenyon understood the point. He said that 'if this Bill was to be supported up to its full extent, there was no person in the kingdom almost, however low his degree in life might be, who might not, in a few months, be called upon to answer for contracts made by his wife up to an extent that might ruin him'. Kenyon admitted that, 'One was sorry that tradesmen of reputation should be losers, but when they carried their goods to market, they ought to carry common-sense and common prudence along with them and ought to have made enquiry who this woman was'. 78 The jury 'immediately found a verdict for the defendant'.
Likewise in Dawson v. Gildert, a clergyman defendant was held not responsible for his wife's purchase of millenary articles. Erskine, for the defendant, described the wife as 'in the wane of beauty' but 'still retaining the most passionate fondness for splendor of dress'. After paying one bill to the plaintiff, the defendant had 'strictly enjoined her [the plaintiff] not to give his wife any further credit'. Lord Kenyon said that if the plaintiff were to recover her demand 'after she had received the notice not to trust the Lady, there could be no domestic security' -the clergyman was only 'bound to
The Times, 2 July 1793, 3.
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The action was brought to recover on a bill for £92.15s.9d. The clergyman's annual income was £230 to £250. A witness for the defendant, Miss Foster, was in the shop when the defendant's wife made her purchases. Miss Foster said that the wife 'appeared to be a lady of fashion, and spoke to Lady Hawke, Lady Turner, Lady Say and Sele, and to other ladies of fashion, as if she had been acquainted with them'. Miss Foster 'thought it would have been rude and impertinent to have asked the defendant's lady who she was'. This testimony provoked sarcastic commentary by Erskine: 'When a woman was taken to be a woman of fashion after she had been rigged out in one shop, she might go in full sail into another; and if she spoke to Lady Hawke, Lady Say and Sele, or any other Lady of Fashion about gauze, ribbons, pads, or any other fashionable commodity, she herself forsooth was to be taken to be a woman of fashion also': Ibid. plaintiffs, dressmakers, sought payment for fashionable dresses furnished to the defendant's wife. The defendant and his wife lived together; he was an attorney who depended on his modest practice for income. His wife borrowed a friend's curricle to convey her in style to the plaintiff's shop and later instructed the servants to put the dresses away so that her husband might not see them. Against the instructions of the trial judge (Heath J), the jury awarded the plaintiff the full £183 demanded, 120, that however low a man's circumstances may be, if he allows his wife to assume an appearance which he is unable to support, he is answerable for the consequences'.
81 Heath, Chambré, and Dallas JJ, however, thought the verdict wrong ('grossly wrong', according to Chambré) and ordered a new trial. 82 The second jury returned a verdict of only £15.15s., 'the price of a black dress, which it appeared the husband had seen her try on'. A Tradesman brought an action against the husband for money due to him for the price of some fine cloaths, which the wife had bought of the plaintiff, unknown to the husband. It appeared upon evidence that during the time of a constant cohabitation, the wife, without the privity of the defendant her husband had bought a rich suit of apparel & carryed them to a friend's house, where she dressed, went to plays, operas, & other places of publick resort, and when these amusements were finished, she undressed at her friend's house & returned to her husband in her usual dress. And the question was how far the husband was chargeable to pay the plaintiff for these cloaths. Lord Chief Justice Holt held he was not chargeable at all because they never came to his eye, because the secret manner in which she dressed & used the cloaths entirely disengag'd the husband from any presumption that he consented to the buying of them; neither could they be reasonably comprised under the notion of such necessary cloathing every husband is obliged to afford his wife, and therefore he ought not to pay for them. But held it would have altered the case greatly if it had appear'd she had ever worn the cloaths in her husband's company. The defendant was apparently the plaintiff's father, based on Lord Kenyon's reference to 'the near degree of relationship' between the parties.
Lord Ellenborough in
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Peake Add. Cas. 79. Kenyon also said that there was nothing he could do for the children-that the law obliged the defendant 'to nothing but nurture, which duty expired when the child reached the age of seven', Ibid. at 80.
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The Times, 29 February 1804, 3. instructed the jury that if the wife 'experienced such brutal treatment as to render it impossible for her to live with her husband, then she had a right to get credit upon his account for the necessaries of life'.
The jury verdict was for the plaintiff for £15.13s.1d.
Yet Lord Kenyon's harsher version of the basic rule prevailed for many years in the Court of Common Pleas. In Horwood v. Heffer, 94 the husband (the defendant) was held not to be liable for necessaries supplied to his wife despite his despicable behaviour toward her. He had 'taken another woman into the house, with whom he cohabited', and 'had confined his wife in her chamber under a pretence of insanity'. The wife escaped, and the suit was for necessaries furnished to her afterwards.
At trial, Lawrence J nonsuited the plaintiff because there was no proof of the wife's 'apprehension of her personal safety', and 'however abhorrent from the feelings of a delicate woman, she might give the husband, in some cases, the liberty to take advantage of his own profligacy, as he might have driven her to such behaviour by his bad conduct'.
109
Conclusion
The Court of King's Bench in Marshall v. Rutton (1800), under Kenyon CJ, overruled earlier King's Bench decisions by Lord Mansfield that had allowed creditors to prevail in suits against married women in an expanding set of factual circumstances. As Kenyon confessed in Marshall, he had never been satisfied with the Mansfield decisions, and had wished that a case 'should come to take away all the difficulties'. The Marshall case fulfilled his wish. Kenyon, however, was not the powerful leader of King's Bench that Mansfield had been, and but for fortuities of judicial turnover, the turnabout in Marshall might not have happened.
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(1798) 1 B & P 226.
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The fact that newly appointed judges find ways to effect change while pretending to honor stare decisis is hardly surprising. It is nonetheless important where possible to make the historical record transparent. Lawrence J's manuscripts allow us to see behind the curtain in the influential case of Marshall v. Rutton.
The moral high ground occupied by Lord Kenyon on the subject of marriage was shared by other common law judges of the time, and the creditors who assumed or who were duped into thinking that they were dealing with femes sole were often left unrecompensed. After Marshall, this occurred whenever the wife was the defendant and she could prove her coverture, except in the rare cases when the husband was out of the country in circumstances that could be said to be equivalent to civil death. And even if the husband could be found in England and sued, he could not be held liablenot even for necessaries -if the wife left the home 'willfully and without any reasonable cause', 110 most commonly when she eloped in adultery with a lover. According to the brief, the plaintiff, a widow, married Edward Harris in 1784 after a marriage settlement had been executed, dated 13 November 1784. Two years later, the marriage failed, and the plaintiff on 9 December 1786 moved out, commencing divorce proceedings on 26 January 1787 for cruelty. Mr Harris then preferred at the quarter sessions an indictment against his wife for assault, which was removed to the Court of King's Bench, coming on for trial at the Lent Assizes 1787. The dispute was referred to arbitration and an award was issued, ordering among other things that Mr and Mrs Harris were to live separate and apart from each other.
The plaintiff in her brief itemised the contents (clothing and household linens) packed in two boxes and two trunks that were by contract to be carried by the defendant from Topsham to Alphington, where the plaintiff had taken up residence. The plaintiff alleged that Pyne the carrier (the defendant), in collusion with Mr Harris, allowed the carriage to be stopped on the King's highway in Alphington, after which the boxes and trunks were removed and released to Mr Harris. The principal parts of Eyre CJ's opinion, as noted down by Serjeant Lawrence, were as follows:
husband receiving from a carrier. Had this been the case of wearing apparel only, I might perhaps have been of opinion with the lady. My opinion is that two boxes, contents unknown, delivered to the carrier and afterwards to the husband is a good delivery.
Although the case was not one 'of wearing apparel only', the Declaration itemised the contents of the boxes and trunks, and in addition to household goods, wares, cloth, and linens, the following clothes were listed: '1 bombazine gown and petticoat, 1 black silk gown & petticoat, 1 black satin quilted petticoat, 2 black silk aprons, 2 black silk handkerchiefs, 3 black silk mode cloths, 3 chintz gowns, 1 striped Holland gown & petticoat,'. These clothes, plus '100 yards of black lace, 100 yards of trimmings, 100 yards of bone lace', were characterised in the Declaration as 'necessary wearing apparel of Plaintiff's of large value, to wit of the value of 100£'.
